Prudence

Leo ELDERS S.V.D.Instituto de Filosofía y Teología “Rolduc”, Kerkrade, Países Bajos

Índice

INTRODUCTION : THE CARDINAL VIRTUES

PRUDENCE

1. Prudence considered by itself (Q. 47)

2. The virtues accompanying and assisting prudence (Q. 48)

3. The elements of a prudent decision (Q. 49)

4. The different kinds of prudence (Q. 50)

5. The virtues which assist prudence (Q. 51)

THE VICES OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE

1. Imprudence (Q. 53)

2. Vices falsely resembling prudence (Q. 55)

INTRODUCTION : THE CARDINAL VIRTUES

In the general introduction the question was raised whether one can assemble from the theological writings of Thomas Aquinas the principles of a philosophical ethics. The answer was affirmative. When dealing with the cardinal virtues a similar question arises: in the second volume of Part II of the Summa theologiae St. Thomas studies the infused supernatural virtues, as appears from the context of this treatise and its location after the discussion of the three theological virtues, faith, hope and love.. He does not explain the difference between the virtues we acquired in a natural way and the infused virtues[1], but his analyses and arguments concerning the nature and division of the virtues are at the level of natural reason. This means that Aquinas sees an analogy and coherence between the natural and the infused moral virtues. The nature and operation of the infused virtues must apparently be studied in the light of the acquired virtues. The acquired virtues, in fact, are taken up into the supernatural virtues. Their practice helps Christians on their way to their supernatural end. For this reason a considerable part of the treatise on the infused moral virtues consists of explanations at the level of natural reason. This justifies presenting the insights of St. Thomas about the cardinal virtues in a study of philosophical ethics. In the following chapters his main conclusions will be put forward.

Chapter VII proposed some general remarks on the virtues. However, the detailed study of the individual virtues must use the principles of the practical intellect. This explains why the treatment of them follows the chapter on natural law. Aquinas considers them in the Secunda Secundæ. Our chapters ten to thirteen discuss the moral virtues in some detail, following the account of Aquinas in the second volume of Part II (the Secunda Secundae) of the Summa theologiae. QQ. 47 - 56 of this Part study prudence, the virtues assisting it and the opposite vices. This is discussed in our present chapter. In following chapters, justice, fortitude and temperance will be examined. Because of the sheer size of Aquinas’s treatise we can present his doctrine only in a concise form.

PRUDENCE

1. Prudence considered by itself (Q. 47)

In most manuals of moral theology published between 1600 and 1920 the treatise on the moral virtues was absent and no special attention was paid to prudence, although this virtue holds a central place in man’s moral life. Q. 47 of the Secunda Secundæ has 16 articles, eight of which deal with this virtue as such, while the following articles illustrate certain aspects of it. The Bible and ancient Christian authors are important sources, but nevertheless the Nicomachean Ethicsholds a central place in Thomas’s text. In our time interest in the virtue of prudence is not very great. For some of our contemporaries it is not obvious at all that one needs a virtue to act wisely, others think that a prudent person is someone who is clever in working for his own interest[2].

As has been shown in Chapter VII prudence has its seat in the intellect in so far as it deliberates and is moved by the will to regulate our actions. Its field of operation comprises our entire life (articles 1 & 2). Since our acts concern individual objects and situations and must be ordered with a view to our final end, prudence must both know the general principles and be able to assess the concrete situations to which these principles must be applied. Thomas differs from Aristotle in so far as he argues that both the knowledge of general principles and their application fall under prudence (article 3). Prudence is a virtue since it makes our actions agree with the fundamental inclinations of our nature, so that they are directed to the good end. At the level of the intellect it produces proper insight (article 4); it is distinguished from the other moral virtues by its association with the intellect, but since it is directed to man’s activity, it differs from such intellectual virtues as wisdom and the knowledge of the first principles (article 5).

While prudence applies general principles to concrete actions, it does not assign goals to what we do: these goals have already been chosen and so it is the task of prudence to help find and determine what leads us to these goals (ea quae sunt ad finem)[3] (article 6). This means that in everyday life prudence helps us to reach some balance (the mean) in our actions (article 7). Its task comprises examining, deliberating over and judging the different options and, next, indicating what is to be done. For Aquinas this last function is an essential part of prudence, which includes more than deliberations alone which would not really engage us[4] (article 8).

Energy and thoroughness[5] are characteristic of the prudent person. As Aristotle writes, thorough and even time-consuming deliberation is needed first, but then one must carry out rapidly what one has decided to do[6]. St. Augustine for his part stresses this thoroughness one must proceed with[7]. To be prudent involves much more than circumspection (article 9). One might think that the major task of prudence concerns one’s private life exclusively. In fact, Aristotle writes that people usually consider a person prudent who takes good care of his own interests[8]. But Thomas notes that this opinion is against love and right reason. Since our personal goals and our happiness are part of the common good[9], which is at a higher level than our own well-being alone, prudence is also directed to the good of society. Whoever promotes the well-being of the community promotes also his own good[10] (article 10). Since the common good, the good of smaller societies or communities and one’s own well-being are distinct goals, pursuing them requires distinct forms of prudence (article 11). Prudence in governing a community is especially proper to those in positions of leadership, although everyone must possess some of this type of prudence (article 12).

Some people deliberate carefully in order to attain bad ends. In such cases their behaviour shows some external likeness to the virtue of prudence, although they do not have this virtue itself. It also happens that a person acts with prudence in view of some limited goal, e.g. a businessman taking good care of his affairs, but fails to place his work in the context of the whole of his life and obligations. If so then he lacks the perfect form of prudence, something which is also the case when one carefully deliberates but does not execute what prudence suggests. The authentic virtue of prudence gives counsel in view of the end of one’s entire life, as has been argued above[11].

In article 13 Aquinas enquires whether the virtue of prudence is given together with sanctifying grace, while in article 14, speaking of acquired prudence, he points out that, as is the case with the other virtues, prudence is caused by repeated prudent actions. If so then youthful persons cannot yet possess this virtue. But are there not people who are circumspect because of a natural disposition? He replies that the knowledge of first principles, from which general rules for our moral behavior are deduced, is given us by nature, while as regards prudence in our concrete activities, Aquinas distinguishes between goals and what leads to such goals. There are people who have a natural inclination to their true goals and so form a correct judgment about them. But concerning the roads which lead to these goals, the situation of different persons and the type of work they do shows a great variety. Here nature has not determined anything, although it happens that one person understands more quickly what should be done than does another (article 15). Since prudence is active in following our natural inclinations and is not a matter of knowledge alone, oblivion will not so easily occur, because these fundamental inclinations always remain. But intervening passions can hamper our forming judgments according to the first, basic principles (article 16).

2. The virtues accompanying and assisting prudence (Q. 48)

Before going into details on the functioning of prudence Aquinas proposes some distinctions. The Stoics mentioned subordinate virtues which accompany the main virtues[12]. They assigned five or six of these virtues to prudence. Before their time Aristotle had discussed some of them[13]. Cicero speaks of partes prudentiae[14], an expression also used by Aquinas, who gives a survey of the different ways in which one can speak of virtues subordinated to prudence or assisting it:

a) Certain parts taken together constitute a whole, as do the parts of a house. These are called integral parts (partes integrales). Prudence has some such integral parts.

b) Other parts are juxtaposed to the main virtue and belong to the same genus. So we distinguish between prudence in respect of private affairs and prudence in the direction of a community. These juxtaposed virtues are called partes subiectivæ (what is meant is the division of a genus into species).

c) Finally there are auxiliary virtues which concern secondary aspects and are called partes potentiales.

With regard to a) Aquinas found in the works of Aristotle[15], Cicero[16] and Macrobius[17] a good number of valuable suggestions as to virtues active in a prudent deliberation and decision. He distinguishes eight stages in the exercise of prudence, which are discussed in Q. 49, article 1. - The classifications proposed in b) are relatively straightforward. To c) belong the ability to take counsel (eubulia), knowledge of what happens normally (synesis) in similar cases or in a particular fields and insight (gnome) which allows us to project on an act the light of higher principles, so we do not have to follow the usual views of the majority of people.

3. The elements of a prudent decision ( Q. 49)

Q. 49 has eight articles which successively discuss the eight stages or components of a prudent decision. A first step is remembering what normally happens in similar cases. For this experience is required, which can be gained only in the course of time and is stored in one’s memory. At this level remembrance is of great importance. In his answer to the second objection Aquinas notes that one can train one’s memory and offers a method of doing so (article 1). Next he discusses intellectus by which he means the right insight into and evaluation of a self evident principle. An example will illustrate what is meant. At work one must do one’s duty. However, to attend a party until the early hours of the morning is an impediment to good work during the day, so one should leave earlier (article 2). Willingness to learn from others (docilitas) is another component of prudence. In view of the enormous variety of situations and possibilities an individual person cannot easily reach an overview of everything involved, and certainly not within a short time. For this reason he must allow others to help him and in particular seek the advice of elderly, experienced people[18]. In this connection Aquinas stresses also the importance of consulting diligently, frequently and respectfully the writings of one’s predecessors and warns us not to neglect or despise them out of laziness or pride (article 3).

Another quality which helps to form prudent judgments is called solertia. This is the ability, zeal and accuracy which help us find with ease and rapidly the required means for reaching a given goal (article 4). Aquinas often distinguishes between intellectus and ratio. Both belong to prudence. In this connection he understands by intellectus a direct intellectual knowledge of the principles. Deliberating in order to reach certain insights is the work of the mind as ratio. The human mind cannot in one act understand and penetrate everything, in particular as regards concrete events. It must compare and draw conclusions[19] (article 5). As has been said above, it is the task of prudence to arrange what can be ordered to the end in such a way that the end is reached. Past events are now definite and cannot be changed, but what lies in the future and will not necessarily happen can be ordered to the end. This is done by the act ofprovidentia, foreseeing what lies in the future and directing what one does now in regard to it. It goes without saying that, in order to do this, deliberation and right judgment are required. The terms “forethought” and “prevision” express this function of prudence (article 6). Forethought and prevision often go together with circumspection. The end and what is ordered to the end must be good, but it happens again that what as such is good becomes undesirable or even bad because of certain circumstances. Circumspection makes us take into account the situation and the circumstances (article 7). What is good is often accompanied and hampered by something bad. It also happens that what is bad presents itself under the appearance of a good. For this reason great caution is required (article 8).

4. The different kinds of prudence ( Q. 50)

As has been mentioned in Q. 48 the virtue of prudence is like a genus which comprises several species. The first and most striking kind of prudence is the one everybody must use in organizing his own life. Thomas now discusses the prudence needed to govern a state or community. The reason why a particular kind of prudence is required to do so is that wherever a special way of administering and governing is found a special form of prudence is needed. As is obvious, governing a country and a whole people and directing them to the common good is one of the highest forms of prudence for which the virtue of justice is a foremost requisite. Now this is the prudence which those who hold high positions in government ought to have (article 1). On the side of the citizens there should be willingness to cooperate and the sense of belonging to the community so that the government can carry out its task in a meaningful way. One may consider such an attitude part of the prudence proper to the individual citizens (article 2).

The family stands between the political society and individuals. In order to direct the family a special form of prudence is required (article 3). In addition there is a particular type of prudence concerning military matters. What we do with deliberation and art, he explains, agree with what happens in nature, as God has established it. For nature not only sees to it that things maintain and develop themselves but also that they ward off outside influences which attack and harm them. Hence animals too are equipped with a second appetitive power, the irascible faculty, by which they can oppose aggression (article 4). It is thus Thomas’s understanding that organizing oneself against a hostile threat or waging military campaigns demands a special form of prudence.

5. The virtues which assist prudence (Q. 51)

The title of this question is “the partes potentiales of prudence”. The words mean virtues or habitus which help prudence. The first of these assisting virtues mentioned is eubulia, the aptitude for consideration which makes one find the right way to the intended goal within a reasonable time without protracting deliberations and without much hesitation. It is proper to a virtue to make our actions good[20], so that the power of deliberation which perfects them with regard to our human life and our true end (ad finem virtutis) must be called a virtue. People can possess this virtue less than perfectly so that it would not always extend to certain fields of human activity, such as organizing the economy of a country (article 1). But if we understand the virtue of deliberation in this way, is it not identical with prudence itself? No, because where there is a different type of goodness we have to do with a different virtue. Since deliberating well, judging correctly and giving the right commands all differ, the respective virtues responsible for these acts also differ. Aquinas considers commanding the performance of a particular act to be the most proper task of prudence, while deliberation and evaluation prepare for this command (article 2). It happens that a person is able to deliberate, but does not succeed in reaching a judgment or evaluation, if hampered by a poor condition of the sense-power called common sense (sensus communis)[21]. This sense depends partly on our natural dispositions and partly on the way one uses them while it is strengthened by practice. To form a correct judgment it is important that one is not afflicted with worthless or irrelevant sense impressions. A correct disposition of the appetitive faculties can be of some help (article 3). Sometimes a good judgment is not carried out unless perhaps in a negligent way. The command to execute an act is the task of prudence itself, a task which is described by Aquinas as the specific work of prudence[22]. -

The last virtue assisting prudence is gnome[23]. Aristotle uses this term in the sense of a correct understanding of what is equitable, in particular by taking into account the position of other people. Thomas sees this virtue as a prolongation of synesis[24], by noting that sometimes one must evaluate an act in the light of higher principles and do something that goes beyond the rules for ordinary human conduct. An example can illustrate this: those who, despite great risks for their own and their family’s safety were sheltering Jews in Nazi occupied countries, did so in the light of higher principles (article 4). For such behaviour a higher insight is required. This conclusion lays the ground for the theological study of the associated gift of counsel in q. 52.

THE VICES OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE

1. Imprudence (Q. 53)

Following his standard method Aquinas, after having studied a virtue, discusses the vices opposed to it. A text of St. Augustine’s[25] distinguishes between vices which are clearly opposed to the virtue of prudence and others which show a certain resemblance with it, although in reality they are contrary to it. Faults of the first group fall under imprudence. A first question is whether imprudence is a fault or a sin. When the term means just the absence of a virtue, it need not be a sin. Imprudence becomes a sin when one does not possess the virtue of prudence one should have, since one has made no effort to act prudently. In this case a lack of disposition is meant, but it also happens that before performing a particular action one does not deliberate and does nothing of what a prudent person would do. In this case one deviates from the standard rules which make our behaviour wise. This too is sinful (article 1).

What sort of sin is this imprudence? It is a general sin inasmuch as prudence is involved in the practice of all virtues and consequently its opposite, imprudence, has a repercussion on whatever one does. In every sin one commits there is some fault in the act of reason directing to the act[26]. Imprudence can also be called a general vice inasmuch as it comprehends several vices, which correspond to the subdivisions of the virtue of prudence. These concern one’s own personal life, the direction of the affairs of one’s family, the government of the community. Furthermore the following vices are opposed to the virtues assisting prudence: superficiality in one’s judgments, rashness, thoughtlessness, inconstancy and carelessness. Other vices are reduced to these, such as unwillingness to learn from others (article 2).

In order to reach a prudent decision one has to pass through several stages, such as remembering what happened in the past in similar circumstances, making a correct appraisal of the present situation and foreseeing how things will develop in the future. One must compare the different options, be willing to learn from older or more experienced people. If one of these stages is omitted, one acts with precipitation, i.e. one is unwise. Acting with precipitation is sometimes caused by the impetuosity of the will or by the passions. People can be so impetuous or proud that they neglect to pay attention to what leading authorities say (article 3). Another vice leads to wrong judgments. This vice is consists in a failure to take into account those factors which contribute to a correct evaluation[27] (article 4).

Another factor is the lack of resoluteness and constancy in carrying out what one has seen to be the correct way to do something. This lack derives from the will. People may discontinue acting in a certain way which they previously considered to be the right way, once now another course of action has become more attractive. Reason gets involved and errs by rejecting what it had at first seen as good. This is obviously imprudent, i.e. there is a lack of steadfastness opposed to prudence (article 5). Finally Thomas attempts to identify the roots of imprudence. In order to reach a prudent judgment one must not be carried away by representations and impressions of the sensory powers. Desire for pleasure may easily make one neglect wise deliberation about a situation and a careful evaluation of all the factors involved[28] (article 6).

2. Vices falsely resembling prudence (Q. 55)

In the first two articles of this question Thomas, referring to a text of St Paul about the prudentia carnis[29] , discusses the case of people who make the inclinations of what our lower appetitive faculties desire their final goal (articles 1 & 2). When our deliberation has a merely apparent good as its object or when, in order to reach a particular goal, one uses cunning means, then one proceeds in a way which can appear prudent, but in reality is no more than astuteness (article 3). Finding crafty means of reaching a goal is the work of astuteness, but when one actually resorts to them we speak of ruse (dolus). Deceitfulness shows in particular in one’s words (article 4). If one passes to action we have to do with deceit (article 5).

The next two articles deal with exaggerated solicitude for temporal things. Cf. Matthew 6, 31: “Do not be worried about what you will eat or drink or where to find clothes”. This solicitude goes too far when one considers temporal goods as man’s main goal. Moreover, there is a risk that one becomes concerned exclusively with these things, so that no time is left to occupy oneself with things spiritual. Finally, the Gospel saying could also mean that one should not be needlessly anxious about lacking what is really needed (article 6). The words “Be not concerned about to-morrow” (Mt 6, 34) mean that one should not be unduly preoccupied with what may come at a later moment, for each day has its own tasks and worries[30] (article 7). All the vices we have discussed suppose a certain use of our reason, something which is not always the case with sins at the level of sensuous passions. One uses one’s reason correctly when one acts according to justice. A wrong use of our reason originates when one acts against justice. Especially avarice and love of money may lead to such injustice (article 8).

Notas

[1] See E. Schockenhoff, o.c., 334 ff.

[2] Cf. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, III, last part. See also B. Waltz, Genitrix virtutum. Zum Wandel des aristotelischen Begriffs praktischer Vernunft, Münster (Lit-Verlag), 1986.

[3] One finds the expressio in E.N. 1144a8 and parallel texts: the moral virtues ensure that we direct ourselves to our true ends, prudence makes us use the right ways and means in order to reach these ends. The expression ea quae sunt ad finem has a broader sense than the word “means”.

[4] Q. 47, a. 8: “Et est tertius actus eius præcipere; qui quidem actus consistit in applicatione consiliatorum et iudicatorum ad operandum. Et quia iste actus est propinquior fini rationis practicæ, inde est quod iste est principalis actus rationis practicæ et per consequens prudentiæ”.

[5] In this context the Latin word sollicitudo has the meaning of the careful and energetic carrying out of a task. Referring to the etymology Isidore gives of the word Thomas writes that sollicitude means that one “ex quadam solertia animi velox est ad prosequendum ea quae sunt agenda”.

[6] E.N. VI, c. 10, 1142b4..

[7] De moribis Ecclesiae, c. 24.

[8] E.N., c. 9, 1142a1 ff.

[9] See the appendix to the previous chapter.

[10] Art. 2 ad 2: “Qui quaerit bonum commune multitudinis, ex consequenti etiam quærit bonum suum”.

[11] “... quæ ad bonum finem totius vitæ recte consiliatur, iudicat et præcipit”. Cf. I-II 58, 5.

[12] SVF III 264 (Stobaeus, Eclogae, II, 60, 9).

[13] E.N. VI, c. 9, 1142a32 ff.

[14] Rhetorica II 53.

[15] E.N. VI, c. 5, 1143b5.

[16] Rhetorica III, c. 16; De senectute, 78.

[17] In Somnium Scipionis, I, c. 8.

[18] Cf. Aristotle, E.N. VI, c. 11, 1143b11.

[19] Thomas stresses that intellectus and ratio are not different faculties or powers but different operations of the same intellect. “Nomen intellectus sumitur ab intima penetratione veritatis, nomen autem rationis ab inquisitione et discursu”.

[20] In his answer to the second objection Aquinas observes (against those who doubt whether the gift of deliberation should be called a virtue) that whatever has to do with man’s activities must be perfected by some virtue: “Oportet enim circa omnia humana perfici per virtutem”. He re-affirms that the virtues cover the entire field of human actions.

[21] The sense power of common sense collects, puts together and distinguishes the impressions of the external senses, a function which St. Thomas sometimes calls ”judging”. Cf. In IV Sent. d. 44, q. 2, a. 1 ad 3; S. Th. I, 57, 2 and this article.

[22] Art. 3 ad 3: “Et ideo post virtutem quae est bene iudicativa, necessaria est finalis virtus principalis quæ sit bene præceptiva, scilicet prudentia”.

[23] E.N. VI, c. 11, 1143a19. The term γvώμη has the general sense of a realistic appraisal of a question. In rhetoric it determines the real meaning of what is said.

[24] Knowledge of what normally happens in similar cases. See above Q. 48, c).

[25] Contra Julianum IV, c. 3 (PL 44, 748)): “Omnibus virtutibus non solum sunt vitia manifesta discretione contraria, sicut prudentiæ temeritas, verum etiam vicina quodammodo, nec veritate sed quadam specie fallente similia, sicut ipsi prudentiæ astutia”.

[26] “Nullum enim peccatum accidere potest nisi sit defectus in aliquo actu rationis dirigentis”.

[27] “Inconsideratio maxime opponitur rectitudini iudicii”.

[28] Art. 6, ad 3: “Vitia carnalia intantum magis extinguunt iudicium rationis inquantum longius abducunt a ratione”.

[29] Romans 8, 7.

[30] “Unicuique enim tempori competit propria sollicitudo”.